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WHO NEXT, THE JANITORS?*
A SOCIO-FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE STATUS
HIERARCHY OF LAW PROFESSORS
Kathryn M. Stanchi**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an invitation to those in the legal academy who self-identify as
egalitarian, as feminist, or as otherwise committed to equality in the law and the
legal profession. The essay asks feminists and egalitarians to notice and resist
the institutionalized and illegitimate status hierarchy operating in American law
schools. Like any status hierarchy, its boundaries are well defined and well
enforced. Additionally, and perhaps not surprising to feminists, this hierarchy is
gendered, with the lowest rank overwhelmingly composed of women and the
highest rank overwhelmingly composed of men. The players in this status
hierarchy are the faculties and administrations of American law schools. At the
top are the tenured "doctrinal" professors, roughly 70 percent of whom are male;
at the bottom are legal writing professors, roughly 70 percent of whom are
female.'
The title of this essay derives from a comment made by a law school dean at a meeting of the
American Bar Association Council on Legal Education, during a hearing in which the Council was
urged to require law schools to treat legal writing professors as professionals. E-mail from Jan M.
Levine, Temple University School of Law, to Kathryn M. Stanchi (Oct. 15, 1997) (on file with
author). The comment was probably a reference to the work of Duncan Kennedy, whose
suggestion regarding the rotation of labor within law schools is well known. DUNCAN KENNEDY,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 79
(1983). By repeating this statement, I do not mean in any way to disparage the jobs of janitors.
Rather, I use this quote primarily to reveal to those who consider themselves above such a
sentiment the reality of the classism and elitism that underlies the treatment of legal writing
professors by American law schools.
.. Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Sue Liemer for organizing the Association of American Law Schools' panel that gave rise to
this Symposium, and Nancy Levit and the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, who
did a tremendous amount of work organizing the Symposium. The author also thanks Jan Levine
for recommending her for the panel and for his steadfast support of the legal writing profession.
Sandra Di Iorio provided excellent research assistance for the piece. This essay is dedicated to my
father, Ed Stanchi. I wish I could send him a reprint.
1 Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 326, 347 (2000). The legal writing percentage is an amalgam of several statistics.
ASSN. OF LEGAL WRITING DIREcToRs/LEGAL WRITING INST. 2003 SURVEY RESULTS, 2, 37 (2003)
available at http://www.alwd.org/alwdResources/surveys/2003survey/PDFfiles/2003surveyresults.-alwd-.pdf
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter ALWD Survey] (indicating that 75 percent of those
completing the ALWD Survey, which includes legal writing directors and teachers in a program
without directors, are women; full time legal writing professionals are 67 percent female; part-time
legal writing professionals are 71 percent female). The statistic seems to hover fairly consistently
around 70 percent, and given the statistics on new legal writing hires, is not likely to change
radically. Id. at 42 (indicating that in 2003, new legal writing professor hires were 67 percent
female). However, the recent drop below 70 percent is quite interesting, especially because it
correlates with an increase in salary and status for the profession. As more males enter the legal
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This institutionalized status system is based on elitism and gender
discrimination. It reflects a rigid and empty adherence to a set of artificial and
contrived rules of prestige and rank that are unjustifiable and enforced by power
and dominance rather than reason. Even more troubling is the way that the
hierarchy is gender segregated, with women at the bottom and men at the top.
Anytime a substantial cluster of women hold low-pay, low-status jobs, feminist
and humanist alarms should ring.2 They should be ringing now.
Part II of this essay begins by defining two basic theories to help describe
and explain the legal academy's status hierarchy-social inequality theory and
feminist theory. These two theories are certainly not mutually exclusive: status
hierarchies that function within particular institutions will reflect the prejudice of
the larger society, including its sexism. Both social inequality and feminist
theory are useful here because the treatment of legal writing professors reveals a
place where social dynamics of hierarchy and power intersect with gender. The
treatment of legal writing is a story about gender discrimination, but it is not
solely about gender. The story also tells of the human propensity to create
subjective and artificial hierarchies, in which some people are elevated at the
expense of others.
In Part II, the essay uses inequality and feminist theories to show the legal
academy's gendered hierarchy is illegitimate and therefore inconsistent with
notions of fairness and equality. The essay seeks to convince feminists and other
fair-minded academics that their own principles require them to reject and resist
this discriminatory treatment. Among other things, Part III explains that the legal
academy has created, and continues to support, a whole cadre of underpaid
lawyers who are mostly women. This alone should be a problem for feminists
and egalitarians.
Part III also discusses the substantial non-economic mistreatment, such as
disenfranchisement, segregation, and interference with academic freedom. These
non-economic abuses clearly show the power dynamic substituting for rationality
in the academic hierarchy. As with most illegitimate status hierarchies, the
treatment of legal writing is marked by tautological arguments that "bootstrap"
the position of the "haves" over the position of the "have-nots" so that
membership in the lower status group presumptively means less pay, less security
and less everything. Moreover, because women comprise the majority of the
legal writing underclass, the non-economic disparagements to which legal
writing professors are frequently subjected reveal a disturbing underlying
writing profession, the salary and status seem to increase. See Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M.
Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools' Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
3, 27 n.3 (2001) (stating that legal writing faculty is 73% women based on 2001 ALWD Survey)
[hereinafter Gender and Legal Writing]. Legal writing teachers are not the only law teachers at or
near the bottom of the hierarchy of the legal academy, but according to a recent study, the bottom
of the hierarchy is disproportionately occupied by women. Marjorie E. Komhauser, Rooms of
Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law School
Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293, 295; see generally Neumann, supra.
2 See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1997).
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presumption about the way women can be treated within the confines of
predominantly male institutions.
In Part IV, the essay explores affirmative reasons why law professors
should support equal treatment for legal writing professors. The pedagogy of
legal writing is, in many ways, more humanist than traditional law pedagogy.
For many years, legal scholars have questioned the teaching methodologies that
dominate most American law schools. Legal writing represents a sound
alternative pedagogy because it is cooperative, less combative and hierarchical,
and directly focused on the human context and consequences of legal problems.
Echoing many feminist critiques of the legal academy, Part IV goes on to ask
why there must be only one model of law professor and suggests that feminist
theory supports the idea of multiple models of excellence in the law professorate,
including one that focuses primarily on teaching, mentoring and training future
lawyers.
In sum, this essay asks feminist and egalitarian law professors and deans to
be honest and to look carefully at the situations in their own law schools and at
their participation (active or passive) in the status hierarchy that keeps a majority
of women lawyers in the law school in a subordinate position. It urges law
professors who write about the damage of hierarchy and discrimination in other
contexts to look, to notice and to fight the inequality in their own backyards.
In the end, like many status hierarchies, the one examined here is damaging
and counter-productive. It damages the integrity and legitimacy of law schools
and professors because it stands in stark contrast to the educational mission of
fairness and non-discrimination. It hurts the whole law school community by
wasting talent, breeding resentment among colleagues, and alienating people
from their community. It makes law professors look dishonest and hypocritical
to students, to practitioners and to those outside the profession. It reinforces
stereotypical images of women to male and female students. It is, in sum, a
situation that egalitarian law professors, if they practice what they preach, must
notice, criticize and resist. This essay is a call to professors to take those steps.
II. STATUS INEQUALITY AND FEMINISM
The legal writing profession is a place where the complexities of
institutionalized inequality, economics and gender bias intersect. Therefore,
social stratification theory and feminist theory can provide a framework for
analyzing the status hierarchy of law faculties. By using these theories as a
framework, I do not mean to suggest that the hierarchy of law faculties fits
precisely into either theory. Rather, I use these theories to demonstrate the
commonalities between the treatment of legal writing and the type of social
stratification that exists elsewhere in society. This comparison is meant to
expose the mistreatment of legal writing as a form of illegitimate and unfounded
stratification. Feminist theory provides the missing piece of the analysis by
demonstrating that gender discrimination is at the heart of this hierarchy in which




In social theory, institutionalized inequality refers to "structured inequality
between categories of individuals that are systematically created, reproduced,
[and] legitimated by sets of ideas."3 Although the source of institutionalized
inequality can vary, due to its categorical nature it is often thought to be the result
of structural systems or conditions, such as discrimination, as opposed to
"inevitable personal differences between individuals." Social stratifications are
less legitimate to the extent that they rely on contrived or artificial criteria to
support themselves, and to the extent that they block access not only to social
rewards, but to opportunities for securing those social rewards. 5
"Class" is a type of social inequality that is usually thought to be primarily
economic, but the concept is ultimately difficult to define. This paper will try to
be quite careful in its use of the concept of "class," but because there are facets of
the academic hierarchy that implicate "class" in the Marxist sense, it is worth
briefly defining. In the traditional Marxist view, "class" is a rather specialized
term referring to an economic phenomenon and defined by an individual's
ownership or control (or lack thereof) in the system of production.7 Class is
relational and the relationship is defined by conflict: workers are members of the
working class because of their relationship to capital and capitalists.8 Moreover,
the relationship is one of exploitation: capitalists exploit the labor of the working
class. 9 Although some sociologists perceive class to be purely economic, others
view it as multidimensional and include in the concept of class other variables
such as prestige or education. 10
Status is a concept related to, but also different from, the concept of class."
Status inequality is multi-dimensional.'2 It refers to a ranking or hierarchy based
3 CHARLES E. HURST, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: FORMS, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES 3 (4th ed., Allyn &
Bacon 2001) (emphasis added).
4Id. at 4.
5 David B. Grusky, The Contours of Social Stratification, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE,
AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 17 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
6 Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 799, 817 (2003) ("asking '[w]hat is the meaning of
'class'?' feels... like falling off a cliff."); see also PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GuIDE THROUGH THE
AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEM 24 (1983) ("Nobody knows for sure what the word class means.").
7 HURST, supra note 3, at 14; see also Karl Marx, Alienation and Social Classes, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 65 (David B. Grusky
ed., 1994) [hereinafter Alienation].
s Marx, Alienation, supra note 7, at 65-69; Karl Marx, Classes in Capitalism and Pre-Capitalism,
in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (David B.
Grusky ed., 1994) [hereinafter Classes]; HURST, supra note 3, at 14-15; Mahoney, supra note 6, at
818.
9 Marx, Alienation, supra note 7, at 65-69; Marx, Classes, supra note 8, at 69-75; HURST, supra
note 3, at 14; Mahoney, supra note 6, at 818.
10 HURST, supra note 3, at 14-15; Mahoney, supra note 6, at 818-19 (noting, however, that neo-
Marxists have a somewhat more flexible view of class).
" HURST, supra note 3, at 35; Mahoney, supra note 6, at 818.
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on some characteristic that has subjectively been assigned social importance.' 3
Status inequality is most closely associated with social theorist Max Weber, for
whom status was determined by "specific, positive or negative social estimation
of honor."'14 Thus, categories of individuals are either given or not given market
opportunities, life chances and symbolic rewards, such as homage and respect,
based on their possession, or lack of possession, of some characteristics
considered by the community to be worthy of respect. 15 Unlike Marxist classes,
which are based on largely objective economic criteria, status is purely subjective
and can be based on highly arbitrary, artificial and unstable criteria.'6 Because
they are subjective and contrived, the criteria are changeable and may differ over
time or between cultures. As Paul Fussell wryly noted, "[tihe things that
conferred [status] in the 1930s-white linen golf knickers, chrome cocktail
shakers, vests with white piping-are, to put it mildly, unlikely to do so today.'
17
Status hierarchies are typical of societies dominated by tradition or
convention.' 8 They are phenomena of power.19 These hierarchies have a number
of characteristics, all of which are designed to maintain the status and power of
the higher ranked group. First, the higher ranked groups tend toward "closure";
that is, they are exclusive.20 The higher status groups try to maintain "purity"
and distance themselves socially from the lower status groups.2' Exclusion is one
of the primary methods "by which those in powerful status groups" maintain
power and keep others from gaining power.22 In fact, "the distinguishing feature
of exclusionary closure is the attempt by one group to secure for itself a
privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of
subordination. 23 Another method of "closure" is the stigmatization or belittling
of the lower status group.24 It is emblematic of categorical or collectivist status
hierarchies "that subordination is experienced through a myriad of direct personal
degradations and affronts to human dignity, encouraged by the submersion of the
12 HURST, supra note 3, at 35.
13 Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 113, 117-18 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994); HURST, supra note 3 at 35;
FUSSELL, supra note 6, at 24.
14 Weber, supra note 13, at 117; HURST, supra note 3, at 35-36; FUSSELL, supra note 6, at 24.
15 HURST, supra note 3, at 36.
16 id.
17 FUSSELL, supra note 6, at 18.
18 HURST, supra, note 3, at 37. The analogy to the legal profession-a profession dominated by
rules and conventions-is apparent.
19 Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION:
CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVE 131, 133 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
20 Max Weber, Open and Closed Relationships, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND
GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 126, 126-28 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994); HURST, supra
note 3, at 37.
21 Weber, supra note 20, at 126-28; HURST, supra note 3, at 37.
22 HURST, supra note 3, at 37.
23 Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION:
CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 141, 144 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
24 HURST, supra note 3, at 44.
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individual into the stereotype of his 'membership' group. ' 2" Thus, the
maintenance of status hierarchies depends on the identification of membership
groups or ranks by certain signs, "caste marks" or stigmata.26 Finally, higher
status groups tend to monopolize economic opportunity and acquisition.
A characteristic of status hierarchies is that they attempt to legitimate
themselves by passing themselves off as meritocracies. The process of
legitimizing the hierarchy occurs in part through the trading of what Pierre
Bourdieu referred to as "cultural capital"-those characteristics chosen for honor
in status hierarchies.28  Status hierarchies legitimate themselves by "trading"
more obviously subjective cultural capital for characteristics that look more
"objectively" like merit. 29 So, for example, a family name can be "traded" for a
law degree from Harvard. In this way, the hierarchical process is
so seamless and unobtrusive that the sources of individual dispositions are
concealed from view, and the "superior" tastes and privileged outcomes of
socioeconomic elites are therefore misperceived (and legitimated) as the
product of individual merit or worthiness.
30
In this way, status can be exploited so that social rewards and opportunities
are distributed by virtue of position, as opposed to skill or other merit-based
criteria.3'
Credentialism is a method of exclusionary closure that allows status
hierarchies to appear meritocratic.32 Credentialism is the inflated use of certain
credentials for the purpose of restricting entry into a position to enhance its
market value and monopolize social rewards. While there may be nothing
wrong with distribution of social rewards through a legitimate meritocracy,
credentialism is a symptom of an illegitimate hierarchy because the importance
25 Parkin, supra note 23, at 151-52.
26 FUSSELL, supra note 6, at 32-33 (describing the differences between social classes in terms of
"distinct stigmata," "signs" and "caste marks").
27 Weber, supra note 20, at 128-29; HURST, supra note 3, at 37.
28 HURST, supra note 3, at 42.
29 Id. Duncan Kennedy made a similar point in his critique of legal education. KENNEDY, supra
note *, at 36-38, 50 ("[T]he class/sex/race system gets hold of people long before the professional
one, and creates them in such a way that they will, with some legitimating exceptions, appear to
deserve on professional grounds the position that is in fact based on other things.").
30 Grusky, supra note 5, at 20. For example, Bourdieu described the phenomenon in which the
cultural capital of higher education is used to systematically "bootstrap" the position of the higher
classes, and allow status to pass for individual merit. Higher education helps legitimate the
position of the upper ranks "because, on the surface, it appears that the inequality is largely the
result of individual performance in a meritocratic, open educational system." HURST, supra note 3,
at 42.
3" Erik Olin Wright, A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 98, 104 (David B.
Grusky ed., 1994) (discussing Roemer's elaboration of Marxist theory).
32 Parkin, supra note 23, at 145.
33 Id. at 147.
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of certain credentials is either inflated or contrived and used solely to simplify
and legitimate the exclusionary process. Hierarchical systems relying on
credentialism construct the higher status jobs as more complex and requiring
enhanced credentials, without offering any evidence of a link between credentials
and performance of the job.34 Job performance and other merit-based criteria
thus become subordinate to the subjectively chosen "credential," and those
without the credential are presumptively excluded from opportunities at the
higher ranked job, while simultaneously the elite are protected from "the hazards
of the marketplace. 35
What is wrong with status hierarchies? Functionalists might argue that
most status hierarchies are meritocratic in the sense that rank or prestige equate
with the importance or skill level of a particular position and the scarcity of
talented people with which to fill these positions. 6  Even those who might
defend some status hierarchies, however, agree that they are less legitimate to the
extent that they block the opportunity to secure certain rewards on the basis of
membership in a particular group.37 A hierarchy that blocks opportunity is non-
meritocratic because it is not a real competition-only a select few are permitted
to "compete" for certain rewards. Moreover, the legitimacy of the hierarchy is
even more suspect when membership in a particular group, as opposed to merit-
based factors, is the criterion that dictates access to opportunities. When a status
hierarchy exhibits this kind of collectivist exclusion, careful examination is
critical to determine whether the evaluation of the higher status position as
essential and highly skilled is accurate, as opposed to a mere reflection of power
differentials. 38 This examination is especially important when a status hierarchy
(e.g., of occupation) mirrors a discriminatory inequality of society at large, such
as when a particular low-status position is filled with those already marginalized
in society as a whole.
B. Feminist Theory
Patriarchy is a type of illegitimate social hierarchy based on gender.39
Patriarchy is defined by a set of interrelations among men that allow men to
dominate women and monopolize benefits and rewards by, among other things,
34 Id. at 148.
3" Id. at 148-49.
36 Kingsley Davis & Wilbert E. Moore, Some Principles of Stratification, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 39, 39-40 (David B.
Grusky ed., 1994).
37 Grusky, supra note 5, at 17.
38 Melvin M. Tumin, Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 47, 47 (David B.
Grusky ed., 1994).
39 Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More
Progressive Union, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 570, 570 (David B. Grusky ed., 1994).
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controlling women's labor.40 Within patriarchy, for example, there is a strict
division of labor based on sex, in which women do the services that "exonerate
men" from unpleasant tasks of low prestige and low social reward. 4' The labor
done by women (so-called "women's work") is devalued, disparaged, and
underpaid, because it is done by women, and at the same time women are pushed
into work that is devalued, disparaged and underpaid (the work then becomes
"women's work"). This process aids in the perpetuation of male dominance by
ensuring a sexually segregated hierarchy, and, as a result, women's economic
dependence on men.
Feminist theory posits that the social relations that create the concept
"women's work," as well as the processes by which women are pushed into work
that is accorded the lowest prestige and reward, are intentional and highly
efficient-in Catharine MacKinnon's words, "metaphysically nearly perfect.
That women are continually pushed to the bottom of the social hierarchy is
neither coincidence nor a by-product of "women's essential nature. 43 Rather,
the system of patriarchy is set up so that women are channeled into work of low
social reward, and whatever work women find themselves doing is presumptively
categorized as unimportant and unskilled, and therefore appropriately
unrewarded. 4 As MacKinnon noted: "so long as women are excluded from
socially powerful activity, whatever activity women do will reinforce their
powerlessness, because women are doing it; and so long as women are doing
activities considered socially valueless, women will be valued only for the ways
they can be used.""
This circular dynamic in which (i) what women do is assigned low value
because women do it and (ii) women are channeled into positions of low value
because those positions are "women's work," is a paradigmatic example of the
"bootstrapping" nature of illegitimate status hierarchies. The construction of low
wage and low prestige "women's work" is not based on "objective" merit, but
rather, is a complex process that involves the interplay of a number of factors, all
of which, at their core, reflect male dominance. 46 Under patriarchy, men get first
choice of jobs over women, and men can and will choose the more advantageous
40 Id.; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 32-33 (2000) (describing the phenomenon of
male "ownership" of female labor).
41 Hartman, supra note 39, at 570-7 1.
4 2 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 116(1989).
43 See generally id. at 125, 159, 161-63, 167.
4Id. at 223.
45 Id. at 80.
46 WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 37-82 (Barbara F. Reskin &
Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986) [hereinafter WOMEN'S WORK]; Myra H. Strober, Toward a General
Theory of Occupational Sex Segregation: The Case of Public School Teaching, in SEX
SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 144, 146-47 (Barbara F.
Reskin ed., 1984); Karen Oppenheim Mason, Commentary: Strober's Theory of Occupational Sex
Segregation, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, AND REMEDIES
157, 164-65 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984); Tumin, supra note 38, at 47-54.
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positions.4 7 Furthermore, mostly men do the hiring and will hire men into the
more advantageous positions, in part to maintain male privilege and women's
economic and social dependence on men.48 Thus, despite the common
misconception that women freely "choose" lesser jobs, men's behavior and
choices are central to the construction of "women's work." 49
Once a job becomes predominantly female, employers will keep the pay
rate low and/or fail to increase wages at the same rate for other jobs, and strong
market and social forces will work to maintain its gender assignment.50 In part,
this is accomplished by a version of "credentialism": once a job becomes
"female," it is mythologized as easier, unskilled and worthless; similarly, once a
job becomes "male" it is mythologized as difficult and highly skilled .5 This is
especially effective if the job can be constructed as "feminine"-such as any jobs
smacking of nurturing or support. 2 Maleness, by contrast, is cultural capital that
can be easily traded for characteristics that look "objectively" more like merit,
and therefore can be translated into positions of high power and prestige.53
However, the same cycle can work to construct a low prestige, low wage.... 54
cadre of women workers even when the work done is virtually identical. Male
workers have a strong interest in maintaining occupational segregation and in
promoting the occupational mythology, because without these artificial buffers,
male workers who demand higher wages would face competition from low wage
(female) workers who would do the same jobs for less money.55 Thus, male
workers in the labor force seek to restrict low wage labor to a narrow market of
poorly paid positions in which they have no interest.56 The employers participate
in this process, even though it conflicts with profit maximization, because of the
desire to maintain male privilege, as well as the "taste" for discrimination and the
strong pull of gender ideology,
For feminists, a system of occupational sex segregation that is defended
based on "objective" merit is suspect. Under patriarchy, "objective" merit is a
47 As MacKinnon has argued in the context of women's segregation into low paying jobs: "no man
would do that [low paying] job if he had a choice, and of course he has because he is a man, so he
won't." MAcKNNON, supra note 42, at 36.
48 Strober, supra note 46, at 146-48; WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 46, at 38-41.
49 Strober, supra note 46, at 146-47, 150. For feminists, the idea that women simply "choose" life
paths of lesser financial and social rewards is a patriarchal myth that serves to obscure how gender
discrimination severely limits the alternatives available to women. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 37-
39.
50 Strober, supra note 46, 149-50.
"' Id. at 153.
52 Mason, supra note 46, at 164-65; see also MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 109-10 (listing the
stereotypes assigned to women).53 See MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 224-25.
5 WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 46, at 49 (providing a narrative about a female welder).
55 Strober, supra note 46, at 150; Mason, supra note 42, at 167.
56 Mason, supra note 42, at 167.
57 Strober, supra note 46, at 147-48; WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 46, at 44-45, 47-56; JOYCE P.
JACOBSEN, THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER 323-27 (1994).
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male construct-it is the male standard passing itself off as neutrality and value. 58
Thus, like other illegitimate status hierarchies, patriarchy creates and reproduces
itself by passing itself off as a meritocracy. The reality is, however, that it is a
system under which women rarely can ascend up the "meritocratic" ladder,
because the system is set up to keep them from ascending.59
To fight the economic exploitation of women, feminism seeks, among other
things, to revalue women's contributions by "demonstrating the essentiality and
value of women's ... functions." 6 In the arena of women's labor, women must
"claim a fair share of social product" for their activities, especially those that
patriarchy has rendered largely invisible, and from which men derive significant
professional, social and personal benefits.6'
III. THE STRATIFICATION OF LAW SCHOOL FACULTIES
The stratification of American law school faculties is a patriarchal
illegitimate status hierarchy. First of all, it is institutional and categorical.
Subordination is based on category, with legal writing professors at the bottom
and doctrinal faculty at the top (and several gradations in between). The
categories are real and largely fixed.62 They are based on a system of contrived
and subjective criteria, and prestige and other rewards are awarded based on
membership in the category, as opposed to "merit." The position of the higher
ranked group is "bootstrapped" by a number of methods, including credentialism,
designed to keep the lower ranked groups in the lower ranks and to make that
lower designation look as though it is based on objective merit.
The law school status hierarchy also exhibits all of the characteristics of a
stratified society. Those who occupy the higher ranked doctrinal positions
monopolize economic rewards. They tend toward closure and exclusion. Those
in the lower ranked legal writing (and often clinical) positions have significantly
restricted opportunities for social reward and occupational "life chances." The
lower ranked categories are marked or stigmatized in a number of ways,
including by labeling and by degrading, belittling comments and behavior.
Finally, the legal academic hierarchy is clearly gender based and
accomplishes a stark gender segregation and division of labor within the
academy. Women dominate the lower ranked legal writing positions, and men
dominate the highly ranked doctrinal positions. In this hierarchy, the relationship
58 MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 224; see also WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 46, at 38 (stating that
sex roles are so ingrained that they are "referentially transparent").59 MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 161-63, 167.60 Id. at 65-66 (discussing wages for housework movement).
61 Id. at 66-67.
62 In this way, it is not off the mark to refer to the legal academy as a "caste system." See, e.g.,
Kent D. Syverud, The Caste System and Best Practices in Legal Education, 1 J. ASS'N. LEGAL
WRITING DIRS. 12, 13 (2002) (describing seven "castes" in American law schools). Although
Weber reserved the word "caste" primarily for status hierarchies based on ethnicity or race, the
word generally refers to those status hierarchies in which the status conditions become a stable and
legalized part of society. HURST, supra note 3, at 37-38.
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between the categories (and sexes) is one of exploitation, with legal writing
presumed to be uninteresting, unintellectual "women's work" and doctrinal
teaching presumed to be highly intellectual, challenging and, therefore,
masculine.
A. The Monopolization of Economic Rewards
Within the academic hierarchy, salary is dependent on one's membership in
a particular group, without regard to merit. Moreover, the status hierarchy is
constructed to ensure that the group classifications remain highly stratified. The
hierarchy is constructed so that it is impossible for the lower status legal writing
professors to come close to "catching up" to the salaries of the doctrinal
professors, regardless of productivity, experience, excellence in job performance,
or seniority.
From a purely statistical perspective, legal writing professors are paid a
fraction of what doctrinal professors make. This overwhelmingly female branch
of the academy makes, on average, about $30,000 less than an entry level
assistant professor, about $35,000 less than an associate professor, and about
$55,000 less than a full professor.63 Even assuming that the legal writing
professor receives 5 percent yearly increases, which many do not, it would take a
legal writing professor twelve years to reach the salary of an entry level doctrinal
professor, fourteen years to reach the salary of an associate professor, and
nineteen years to reach the salary of a full professor.64
Of course, these calculations assume that the doctrinal professor salaries
remain stable, which they would not. In reality, the doctrinal salaries would go
up as well, so the legal writing professor really never reaches parity with her
peers. Instead, she must wait twelve years to reach parity with the newest law
faculty hires; the nineteen years reflects her achievement of what full professors
were making when she was hired. Consider a legal writing professor hired in
1990. In 2002 (twelve years), she would be making what an assistant doctrinal
professor was making in 1990. In 2009, she would finally be making what a full
professor was making in 1990. With the system operating "normally," therefore,
she will never reach parity with those with whom she was hired and with those of
equivalent seniority in the academy.
This pay differential is entirely based on membership in the group labeled
"legal writing professors." 65  No evaluation of merit occurs beyond the
63 Jan M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551,577 (2001) [hereinafter Women, Writing & Wages].
64 id. at 577-78.
65 In the legal academy, where professorial academic freedom verges on sacrosanct, this kind of
punitive treatment based solely on subject matter of expertise seems more than a little hypocritical.
Graham Zellick, The Ethical Law School, 36 IND. L. REv. 747, 751 (2003) (stating that "academic
freedom ranks as one of [law professors'] fundamental guiding values"); Jennifer Jolly-Ryan,
Coordinating a Legal Writing Program with the Help of a Course Webpage: Help for Reluctant
Leaders and the Technologically-Challenged Professor, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 479, 483 (2004)
("Academic freedom and the opportunity to develop individual teaching styles are imperative for
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presumption of merit based on group membership. Much like in other
institutionalized systems of dominance and discrimination, no external
"objective" evidence of merit-teaching excellence, scholarship, years, or quality
of law practice-can overcome the stigma of membership in the low status
group.66 Even the primary credentials that purportedly carry so much weight in
the legal academy, prestige of law school and participation on the law review,
cannot overcome the presumptive lower status of legal writing.67 A legal writing
professor who graduated from a top tier law school and served on the law review
would still make less money ($30,000 less) than a torts professor who went to a
third tier law school and had no law review experience.68
Other "objective" merit criteria are similarly irrelevant to salary
determination. For example, in a recent survey, my co-author Jan Levine and I
demonstrated that legal writing professors' salaries were unaffected by two
variables commonly used to calculate doctrinal salaries: years out of law school
and years of teaching experience. 69 Both of these variables were of statistically
low relevance in predicting legal writing salary levels. 70 That means, for
example, that a 2000 law school graduate with two years of practice experience
who teaches contracts will make $25,000 more (at least) than a 1988 law school
graduate with ten years of practice experience who teaches legal writing. This
additional data puts in perspective the nineteen years necessary to reach the full
professor level: that is nineteen years of teaching seniority alone.7' Adding the
number of years of practice experience makes the number of years to reach parity
even higher.
Both the structure and politics of the salary differential are directly related
to gender. Most obviously, the significant salary differential creates a cadre of
poorly paid women lawyers within the legal academy, and those women lawyers
can never reach "equality" with their male counterparts in the higher ranked
positions. This structure is a microcosm of male economic dominance in the
legal academy that both reflects and creates anew the economic disparity
all professors . .."); Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The Disparate
Treatment of Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional
Ethics, 39 DuQ. L. REv. 329, 384 (2001) (characterizing academic freedom as "cherished").
66 Bayer, supra note 65, at 353; Levine & Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages, supra note 63, at
577.
67 Of course, the relevance of these credentials to the performance of the job of law professor is
dubious at best. The credentials certainly have never been shown to correlate to excellent
performance as a law professor. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the illegitimate
credentialism otherwise embraced by the hierarchy is abandoned when it would allow the opening
of opportunity or reward to someone in the lower status group. This adds another layer to the
illegitimacy of the hierarchy and reveals the true power dynamic at work. When even the
illegitimate rules of the hierarchy fail to ensure that the hierarchy is maintained, those in the higher
status positions refuse to apply the unfair rules and fall back on the presumptive inferiority of the
debased group.
68 Levine & Stanchi, Women, Writing, and Wages, supra note 63, at 577.
69 Id. at 573-74.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 578; Stanchi & Levine, Gender and Legal Writing, supra note 1, at 10-12.
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between men and women in American society at large. It also reproduces within
the legal academy the damaging and discriminatory image of women as
categorically unequal to men, as a category of persons less deserving of the
financial rewards of the faculty position.
However, the salary differential for legal writing professors also reflects a
value judgment about the nature and value of certain work, namely "women's
work." Like the "women's work" phenomenon in other contexts, "whether
women are steered into Legal Research and Writing because it is low status, or it
is low status because it is done by women" is unclear.73 What is clear is that the
phenomenon is a circular, ongoing dynamic: as long as women do it, it will be
devalued, and as long as it is devalued, it will be done by women.74 In part, this
is perpetuated by the process of mythologizing that often accompanies the
construction of work as female: doctrinal teaching ("male") is mythologized as
difficult and highly skilled; legal writing ("female") is mythologized as easy and
requiring few skills.75 Moreover, the low salaries are further justified by the
characterization of legal writing as "feminine" care-taking work, much like
nursing and elementary and secondary education. 76 Thus the legal academy
repeats and reinforces a familiar pattern of occupational segregation by sex in
which work done by women is worth little.77
B. Exclusion and Closure
The salary differential, which creates the economic gender hierarchy, is
enforced and maintained by methods typical of illegitimate status hierarchies,
including contrived and easily manipulated criteria posing as merit, physical and
social segregation and imposition of status markers. All of these methods
succeed in branding legal writing as a "less than" category of law faculty, not
worthy of the rewards of "real" law faculty. The gender composition of the two
groups also has the troubling result of correlating the lower status with the gender
female. The result is a clustering of women in positions of low social reward
with purposefully limited access to the means of obtaining social rewards.
1. Bootstrapping and Credentialism
The law school faculty hierarchy bootstraps itself by a number of methods.
One primary method is the somewhat mythical definition of the term "law
73 Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 333, 354 (1996).
74 See MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 80; Strober, supra note 46, at 146-47; Mason, supra note 46,
at 169.
75 See supra notes 50 to 59 and accompanying text.
76 See Stanchi & Levine, Gender and Legal Writing, supra note 1, at 23; Pamela Edwards,
Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 75 (1997).
77 Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female
Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 775, 779, 785 (2001).
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professor"-that is, someone who not only teaches doctrine, but who also
performs certain defined "service" to the law school community, and publishes
doctrinal or theoretical scholarship.78 The definition should be carefully
examined, because illegitimate hierarchies will often attempt to legitimate
themselves by "attach[ing] to the positions [of high status] . . . highly morally-
toned evaluations of [the positions'] importance to society. 79
Upon examination, the definition of "law professor" is clearly constructed
to bootstrap the position into one of higher status within the academy. In some
instances, the definition is not provably related to merit or job performance (as in
the case of doctrinal teaching). But, more important, the hierarchy excludes most
legal writing professors from any opportunity to satisfy the definition. In other
words, the definition is used to make a discriminatory system seem meritocratic;
the criteria that marks the higher ranks is contrived to make certain that the lower
ranks will always seem less worthy. In reality, the lower ranks are not eligible to
satisfy the definition because the definition is a shill.
First, legal writing professors, consistent with their title, do not teach
primarily doctrine. In fact, many are not permitted by their law schools to teach
so-called doctrinal courses.80 Thus, the criteria "teaching doctrine" becomes a
valuable piece of cultural capital that legal writing professors-a large cadre of
women academics-are categorically excluded from possessing. Never questioned
is why doctrine is so strictly bifurcated from lawyering and writing skills, or why
doctrine should be so highly favored over lawyering skills or writing that it
marks an essential component of what makes a law professor. It is simply seen
as presumptively more meritorious, valued, and challenging. The gender
segregation would seem to provide additional reasons for questioning the system.
Why is the subject taught primarily by women considered easy and less valuable?
Why are the subjects taught by men considered difficult and more valuable?
Those who dismiss teaching writing as easy or unintellectual never seem to
answer these concerns. Nor do they seem to even try to explain why (much less
provide any evidence that) teaching torts or criminal law to first year law
students is so difficult that only the most erudite professor can accomplish it, and
why teaching a writing assignment involving an issue of tort law is somehow a
far lesser challenge.8 Would a torts professor who taught torts through a series
78 This is often referred to as the academic triad. See Robert J. Spitzer, Tenure, Speech and the
Jeffries Case: A Functional Analysis, 15 PACE L. REv. 111, 123 (1994). 1 say "mythical" because
doctrinal law professors who do all three of these things well (or at all) are rare. That there are only
a handful of doctrinal professors who actually are succeeding in meeting this mythical norm is
largely ignored, at the same time the norm is used to exploit and disparage clinical and legal writing
faculty.
79 Tumin, supra note 38, at 47.80 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 53 (Question 85, chart).
8I See Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing
Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 117, 148 (1997); Mary Beth Beazley, "Riddikulus!": Tenure-Track
Legal-Writing Faculty and the Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 79
(2000). Rather, those who dismiss legal writing as an academic interest rely on circular,
unsupported observations, such as "writing is writing," or define legal writing in a purposefully and
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of torts-related writing assignments be less worthy of the higher rank than a
doctrinal professor who relied on an end-of-semester examination? Also never
questioned is the common statement of doctrinal teachers that they also do not
teach primarily doctrine, but actually teach "thinking like a lawyer," which
sounds a lot like what legal writing and clinical professors do.82 Why is this
common pedagogical ground not a basis for equality? The answer is that to
maintain a social hierarchy based on power, the criteria need only purport to
substitute for merit-they do not actually need to rationally relate to merit.
83
Legal writing professors also are penalized by the general devaluation of
the art of teaching within the legal academy, which again is a reflection of the
devaluation of what has come to be "women's work" in society at large.
Teaching excellence of any kind is not the most important part of the academic
triad and is valued and rewarded significantly less than scholarly production.
This redounds to the detriment of most legal writing professors because legal
writing instruction requires a dedication to pedagogy and student-centered
teaching.84 This means that almost all legal writing professors will spend a great
deal of time focused on their effectiveness as teachers, time that is largely
uncompensated in the academy.
For legal writing professors, the performance of law school service is
likewise an unattainable piece of cultural capital. Like with doctrinal teaching,
the academic hierarchy holds up certain types of service as valuable cultural
capital, necessary for status, and simultaneously prohibits legal writing
professors from possessing it. Many legal writing professors are not even
eligible to serve on any law school committees, and when they are allowed to
serve, they are not eligible to participate in the more important or highly valued
committees, such as faculty appointments. 8' This means that legal writing faculty
are either not permitted to do service and then are penalized for not doing it, or
are permitted only to do the service jobs that no other faculty wants to do because
they are largely thankless and undervalued. In addition to casting serious doubt
on the legitimacy of the law school faculty hierarchy, this double bind has
created a somewhat bizarre situation. It has become a cause for legal writing
professors to fight for the right to serve on law school committees-work that
they will not be paid for and that most doctrinal faculty members find a
nuisance-just so that they can have a chance at something resembling
participation in their professional community. Given that most of the people
unduly narrow way in order to bootstrap their own position (often without citing any of the legal
writing pedagogical literature). These arguments, devoid of any semblance of logic and put
forward without a shred of evidence, demonstrate that power has trumped reason in the debate over
legal writing. Bayer, supra note 65, at 370, 392; see also Edwards, supra note 76, at 79-80.
82 Melissa L. Breger et al., Teaching Professionalism in Context: Insights from Students, Clients,
Adversaries, and Judges, 55 S.C. L. REv. 303, 308 (2003) ("Doctrinal courses emphasize the ability
to 'think like a lawyer' .... ); Barbara M. Anscher, Turning Novices into Experts: Honing Skills
for the Performance Test, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 224, 250 (2001) (stating that the primary goal of
doctrinal courses is to teach students to think like lawyers).
83 See generally Beazley, supra note 81.
84 See Bayer, supra note 65, at 372-77.
85 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 52-53 (Question 83); see also Bayer, supra note 65, at 359.
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fighting for this dubious right are women, the situation calls to mind Catharine
MacKinnon's poignant statement: "It makes you want to cry sometimes to know
that it has had to be a mission for many women just to be permitted to do the
work of this society, to have the dignity of doing jobs a lot of other people don't
even want to do."
's
Interestingly, the one aspect of law school service in which legal writing
professors excel is one that is at the bottom of the service hierarchy: student
mentoring and contact.87 This is a corollary to the academy's devaluation of
teaching excellence. Legal writing pedagogy, at its core, is student-centered; it
requires frequent student-professor contact, both formal and informal.
88
Therefore, legal writing professors find themselves spending a tremendous
amount of time teaching, mentoring and counseling law students about
everything from writing to careers to law school experiences. 9 The legal
academy, however, rarely "counts" this kind of service toward social rewards
like merit-based raises or tenure.9° Thus, the tautological circle is complete:
valuable service is that which legal writing professors are ineligible to do, and
what service legal writing professors can do is not valuable. Put another way,
"women's work" is code for "work of no value" and "work of no value" is
presumptively "women's work."
Finally, the most important, and complex, criterion-scholarship.
Scholarship is an interesting criterion for a number of reasons. First of all, it is
the primary measurement of law faculty rank; it is, as one scholar put it, "the coin
of the realm."9 1 Perhaps for this reason, it is the criterion often used to justify the
lower legal writing salaries: legal writing professors do not publish so they
should not be paid as much.9 2 This may seem like a reasonable justification, until
an examination of law school policies reveals both the categorical nature of the
discrimination the justification so deftly masks, as well as the shameless
bootstrapping that underlies it. The justification "you do not publish so we do
not pay you as much" implies that law schools would welcome the scholarship of
legal writing professors, that legal writing professors could change the unhappy
reality of our own poor salaries, if only we would publish. The rhetoric is
86 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 35 (1987).
87 Arrigo, supra note 81, at 162-63; Deborah L. Rhode, Midcourse Corrections: Women in Legal
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUc. 475, 482 (2003) (referring to such work as academic "house-
keeping"); Levit, supra note 77, at 784 (describing service activities such as student advising as
"not much more" "than the academic equivalent of making coffee").
88 See, e.g., Jo Anne Durako et al., From Product to Process: Evolution of a Legal Writing
Program, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 719 (1997) [hereinafter From Product to Process].
89 Arrigo, supra, note 81, at 162, 165; Farley, supra note 73, at 356; Ilyung Lee, The Rookie
Season, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 473, 487 (1999).
90 Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23
(1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1183
(1988).
91 Randal C. Picker, Law and Economics: Intellectual Arbitrage, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 127, 127
(1993).
92 Arrigo, supra note 81, at 167-68.
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brilliant in how it implies that legal writing professors are to blame for their own
poor salaries, when the reality is that law schools, by a number of methods, block
legal writing professors from opportunities to publish.
The argument that legal writing professors can be paid less as a group
because legal writing professors as a group do not publish is a categorical
statement typical of group-based discrimination; it is also, like many categorical
generalizations, demonstrably false.93 The statement that "legal writing
professors do not publish" does something very typical of group discrimination:
it lumps all members of a group together, makes a categorical value judgment
based on group membership, and makes no allowances for individual merit-based
differences. 94 Consider the members of the doctrinal professorate who do not
publish after their tenure piece (and they do, without question, exist in great
numbers). Why should they be paid $30,000 to $50,000 more than a legal
writing professor who does not publish? Perhaps more starkly, why should the
doctrinal professor who does not publish be paid more than the legal writing
professor who does? Yet, this is the inevitable result of a category-based
hierarchy.
The more complex part of the picture, however, is that most law schools
cinch the hierarchy by making publication highly valued cultural capital, while,, ,,95
making it a "practical impossibility" for legal writing professors to publish. In
other words, having defined publication as the premier cultural capital, the higher
ranked group then takes every step necessary to monopolize the opportunities to
obtain it.96 Once access to the commodity is monopolized by those in the higher
ranked group, it can be used to demonstrate the "objective" inferiority of the
lower ranks. For example, many law schools categorically bar legal writing
professors from obtaining summer research stipends and student research
assistants. An overwhelming number of legal writing professors are
93 Legal writing professors do publish, even in the face of significant obstacles, and even though
they are not rewarded either financially or otherwise. See, e.g.,
http://www.legalwritingscholarship.org (providing a bibliography of legal writing scholarship); see
also Bayer, supra note 65, at 381-82.
94 A similar logical flaw underlies the statement that legal writing professors have lesser credentials
than doctrinal teachers. Even putting aside all the arguments that the alleged "credentials" are
contrived, artificial criteria divorced from job performance, there is an obvious logic and equality
problem with the categorical statement that one group, as a whole, has lesser credentials than
another group.
95 Arrigo, supra note 81, at 167. For a particularly poignant narrative about the difficulties of
publishing while teaching legal writing, see Susan P. Liemer, The Quest for Scholarship: The Legal
Writing Professor's Paradox, 80 OR. L. REV. 1007 (2001).
g6 Liemer, supra note 95, at 1022-23.
97 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 49-50 (Questions 76, 80). In some cases, even those law schools
that provide summer research stipends to legal writing professors offer lesser amounts to legal
writing professors than to doctrinal faculty. Id. (Question 78). This situation has led the
Association of Legal Writing Directors to create a fund for summer stipend "scholarships" for legal
writing professors who cannot convince their law schools to support their writing. Liemer, supra
note 95, at 1027.
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categorically denied the primary incentive to publish: they are ineligible for
tenure, no matter how much they write, and no matter what the quality. 98 How
many doctrinal professors would publish if they were paid a fraction of their
salaries, got no support and had no expectation of tenure? Many doctrinal
professors do not publish even with all these perks. Yet, the failure of some legal
writing professors to publish is held up as a failure of the writing profession as a
whole and a rational justification for unequal treatment.
While criticizing and penalizing legal writing professors for not publishing,
law schools also impose a workload on legal writing professors that is
incompatible with scholarly production." The average workload for legal
writing professors requires the critiquing of ten to eleven papers by forty-four
students-approximately 3000 pages of student writing-over the course of the
academic year.'0° Legal writing professors generally spend about 100 hours in
formal conference with students and about seventy hours preparing and teaching
assignments. 1' One honest doctrinal professor who added just one paper
assignment to her doctrinal class wrote the added burden "crushed" her with both
emotional and time demands and made her feel "desperate" and "senselessly
angry." 102 With their time almost exclusively taken up with what Deborah
Rhode has called "academic house-keeping," legal writing professors have little
time left to devote to the intense and creative scholarly research and writing
process. 03 Yet most law school administrations usually make no allowance for
the different burdens of legal writing teachers, and doctrinal professors and deans
rarely acknowledge that a different burden exists.
The disparate distribution of teaching workloads in the legal academy
reveal a quasi-Marxist and patriarchal exploitative dynamic. Legal writing
professors bear a disproportionate amount of the legal academy's teaching
burden. Yet, legal writing professors are not paid for this disproportionate
burden-like the operation of labor in the Marxist view, legal writing professors
do not benefit financially from their work. Rather, the fruits of the labor of legal
writing professors are ultimately enjoyed by the higher ranked doctrinal
professors and law school administrations, who are "exonerated" from more
intensive teaching and student advising roles because others are doing this
devalued work. Those in the higher ranks realize the fruits of legal writing labor
in the form of additional free time, as well as intellectual and psychological free
space, which they can then devote to the more highly valued pursuit of
98 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 40 (Question 65).
99 Liemer, supra note 95, 1015-17; Arrigo, supra note 81, at 167 (attributing this 'bootstrapping'
method to "expectancy confirmation sequence," a phenomenon by which a dominant class decide
on the worth of a job, and then set up an environment that will confirm their decision).10o ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 51 (Question 82).
101 Id. at 52 (Question 82).
102 LouISE HARMON & DEBORAH W. POST, CULTIVATING INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAW, AND THE
POLITICS OF TEACHING 96-97 (1996).
103 Deborah L. Rhode, Taking Stock: Women of all Colors in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDuc.
475, 482 (2003).
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scholarship.' 4 Thus, the labor of legal writing professors directly translates into
financial reward for the higher ranks. Especially given the gender composition
of legal writing, the analogy to "women's work" is obvious.r15 Women's work,
by definition, is "support" work of low value and compensation-that which
permits men the time and space to accomplish society's more highly valued, and
highly compensated, pursuits) °6
Even those legal writing professors who do manage to write and publish
find themselves at the mercy of yet another double bind. If they publish about
legal writing or pedagogy, their area of expertise, the scholarship does not
"count" at all or as much as traditional doctrinal scholarship, and it likely will not
be eligible for the same rewards as other scholarship. 0 7 This struggle is similar
to that faced by feminist legal scholars. °8
2. Exclusion from Other Social Rewards and
Imposition of Caste Markers
Maintained by credentialism, the legal academic hierarchy also perpetuates
itself by excluding the lower ranks from rewards other than salary and by
imposing on them obvious markers (or in Fussell's word, stigmata) of lesser
status.' ° Tenure, the quintessential social reward of the academy, and one
closely related to economic compensation, is a reward from which the vast
majority of legal writing professors are categorically excluded. Almost no legal
writing professors are tenured, and most legal writing professors are not even
eligible for tenure, regardless of their credentials, scholarly production or any
'04 Arrigo, supra note 82, at 176.
105 Hartmann, supra note 39, at 571; WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 33 (stating that when women
choose to work at home, men receive "the clean clothes, meals, and child care required to support
his ability to perform as an ideal worker.").
106 Note here that in yet another analogy to women's work, the "support" aspect of legal writing
teaching is what makes it so important for the higher ranked academic positions to fiercely protect
their exclusive access to the highly valued cultural capital of scholarship-by giving legal writing
professors no financial or career incentives to publish, by giving them an oppressive workload, and
by devaluing their scholarship.
107 See Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors and
Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 530, 545 (1995); Beazley,
supra note 81, at 84 (noting that some law schools had forced legal writing teachers to develop a
doctrinal expertise by refusing to count legal writing scholarship toward tenure).
108 Patricia Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REv. 19, 29-32 (1991); Levit, supra note
77, at 793, 795-800; A.B.A. COMMN. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION 31 (1996) ("Women faculty's scholarship
(particularly if labeled 'feminist') is discounted either because it is narrative or experientially-
based, or because it involves 'women's topics,' which are devalued no matter what methodology
has been employed.") [hereinafter ELUSIVE EQUALITY]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar
Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1363,
1372 (1992).
'09 See generally Fussell, supra note 6.
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other merit based criteria." 10 Rather, the vast majority of legal writing professors
in the United States are on one-year contracts, a highly vulnerable employment
position, especially given the rate at which law school deans can change."'
Membership in the group "legal writing professor" means exclusion from even
the opportunity to obtain tenure. Exclusion from the opportunity to earn a social
reward is emblematic of illegitimate status hierarchies; in the legal academic
hierarchy, the exclusion from eligibility for tenure belies that merit is the source
of social reward.
The exclusion from tenure means that legal writing professors have none of
the protections of academic freedom afforded to doctrinal professors." 2 We can
be fired if we anger the Dean or a particularly powerful faculty member, if we
anger a well connected student, or if we fall victim to any of myriad other
decanal or faculty whims. Our ability to speak out about our oppressive
conditions is chilled by our precarious employment status, and so we cannot be
said to have true freedom of speech, even in our own scholarship."' The vast
majority of legal writing professors must continue to worry that speech and
scholarship about controversial ideas of pedagogy and equality will detrimentally
affect their careers. Such a situation is inimical to any meaningful concept of
academic freedom." 4
Legal writing professors also frequently are barred from attending,
participating in or voting at faculty meetings. Although this has changed for the
better, too often many legal writing professors are prohibited from attending
faculty meetings at all." About 10 percent of legal writing professors in
American law schools are prohibited from attending faculty meetings. Of those
legal writing professors who can attend faculty meetings, only about 20 percent
can vote on all matters, and roughly 34 percent are entirely disenfranchised, with
110 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 40 (Question 65). The ALWD Survey reports that only about
24% of legal writing professors are tenured or tenure-track, and the vast majority are working under
one year contracts.
"' Id. Legal writing is replete with stories of summary dismissals, which can be accomplished
without any justification or cause, simply by non-renewal of a short term contract. Consider this
testimony by a legal writing director who had taught and directed for ten years:
[O]n April 7, 2000, the Dean (of one year) summoned me and two other writing
professors into his office to announce bluntly that he had unilaterally decided to
overhaul the legal writing program and that our contracts would not be renewed ....
The Dean announced to the faculty that my dismissal was in no fashion based on a
lack of either capability or effectiveness. Rather . . . he decided to use adjunct
instructors instead of hiring additional professional writing teachers. In that manner,
without warning, without discussion with other concerned persons, without consulting
experts, without regard for my years of service, without consideration of its probable
effect on my decade-long career, and with neither expressions of gratitude nor a
significant promise of support, I suddenly found myself out of my profession.
Bayer, supra note 65, at 329-30.
112 Arrigo, supra note 81, at 168-70.
13 Bayer, supra note 65, at 383-84.
"1 Id. at 383; see also Arrigo, supra note 81, at 168-70.
115 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 53 (Question 84).
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no voting rights whatsoever. 16 Participation in the law school community means
access to and ability to comment on faculty and administrative decisions, and
voting means the ability to register agreement or dissent. In other contexts, of
course, these rights are, quite literally, fundamental, and at the core of what it
means to be a full member of a society. Moreover, beyond the loss of power and
voice, the inability to attend and participate in faculty governance has significant
symbolic and emotional value as well.
The status hierarchy also imposes on legal writing professors other markers
of low status. Like most status hierarchies, the law school stratification system is
maintained and reinforced by separation and branding. Many of these "caste
markers" are of such a petty quality that clearly their only purpose is to maintain
the illegitimate status hierarchy-to keep the lower ranks in their place. The
primary marker is title-a kind of branding typical of the most entrenched
hierarchies. The law school hierarchy has fought to monopolize and keep
exclusive the revered title of "professor" for its doctrinal faculty. The
overwhelming majority of law schools refuse to give legal writing professors the
unqualified title of professor, associate professor or assistant professor of law." 
7
Instead, most legal writing professors are given either the lesser title of "lecturer"
or "instructor" or are given the qualified title of "clinical" professor or professor
"of legal writing."" 8 The clear purpose of this distinctive branding is to make
obvious the separation between the higher and lower ranks of the hierarchy and
to stigmatize the lesser group.
Legal writing faculty also are often physically segregated from the other,
higher ranked faculty." 9 According to the most recent survey of the Association
of Legal Writing Directors, many legal writing faculty have offices that are
separate from the other faculty, with most reporting that their offices are smaller
and in a "less desirable" location than the doctrinal faculty. 20 Other examples of
physical segregation include prohibiting legal writing professors from attending
faculty meetings, from parking in faculty parking areas, or from sitting with
faculty at law school events such as graduation.' 2' The physical segregation, as
well as the other markers, accomplishes a fairly strong social segregation as well,
which contributes to the perpetuation of the unfair hierarchy. Treating people
badly is significantly easier when they are physically out of sight, and not "real"
friends or colleagues.
By these methods, the legal academic hierarchy maintains the "purity" of
the higher ranked professors and provides an obvious method of distancing the
higher from the lower ranks. 22 These methods also support the hierarchy by
openly stigmatizing and belittling the subordinated group. As Parkin stated,
116 id




9 Id. (Question 69).
120 ALWD Survey, supra note 1, at 41 (Question 69).
121 Id.
122 See supra notes 78 to 121 (discussing methods of closure and exclusion).
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hierarchy is served by a "myriad of direct personal degradations and affronts to
human dignity."1 23 The non-economic methods of exclusion and stigmatization
are critical to the maintenance of the hierarchy because, as with credentialism,
one method of closure or stigmatization can be used to justify others, in a parody
of logic and merit. Thus, legal writing professors cannot be eligible for tenure,
because that is reserved for professors of law. Legal writing professors cannot be
professors of law because they are not eligible for tenure. Legal writing
professors should not be permitted to vote or attend faculty meetings because
they do not have job security or tenure. They cannot have job security or tenure
because that reward is reserved for professors of law. The result is an endlessly
self-justifying loop. The situation certainly begs the question of whether those
who advance such arguments see the tautology and simply do not care, or
whether they are so used to power that they do not see the tautology.
The categorical exclusion of legal writing faculty from the social rewards
most closely associated with "real" faculty status also reveals that there lurks
among many faculties a deep investment in the subordination of others. The
petty quality of these degradations, as well as the tenacity with which law
faculties cling to them, reveal a disturbing propensity in the legal academy to
treat subordinates with disdain and disrespect. That the vast numbers of the
subordinated status group are women also demonstrates the legal academy's
comfort with women in subordinate and degraded positions. The segregation and
"marking" of legal writing professors accomplishes a stark gender segregation in
the legal academy, with women predominantly occupying the obviously "less
than" category, and men predominantly occupying the obviously "more than"
category. This situation is both demonstrative and reifying: the situation shows
that the legal academy is comfortable with segregating and cementing women
into a lower status, and that segregation simultaneously creates and reinforces the
correlation of women with lower status.
C. The Feminization of Legal Writing:
Exploiting the Discrimination of the Market
That legal writing is both a stigmatized underclass and is composed of 70
percent women is no coincidence. Rather, the emergence of the legal writing
underclass in law schools correlates chronologically with the influx of women
into law schools, and into the legal profession, in the 1970s.124 The timing and
the market factors, coupled with other evidence, suggest that the feminization of
legal writing occurred as a result of law schools' exploitation of the gender
discrimination in the legal market.
The appearance of the status group of low pay legal writing professors in
American law schools correlates to two historical events that occurred in the
1970s and 1980s: (i) the sharp growth in the number of students enrolled in law
school classes and (ii) the influx of women into the law schools and the legal
123 Parkin, supra note 23, at 15 1.
124 Stanchi & Levine, Gender and Legal Writing, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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profession. 125 The earliest record of a legal writing program, from 1959, shows a
field of male professors who commanded competitive salaries. 126  The sharp
growth in the number of students posed a problem for these law professors.
Because legal writing is so student-centered and labor intensive, the increase in
student enrollment made the class difficult and time-consuming to teach, and the
mostly male professorate no longer wanted to take responsibility for it.
28
However, because of the concurrent influx of women into the legal profession,there appeared in the market a cadre of lawyers waiting to fill the legal writing
niche. This first wave of women lawyers was faced with significant hurdles to
advancement within the legal profession because of gender discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and salary.'3 Largely shut out of law practice because of
discrimination, this first wave of women lawyers was ripe for exploitation.'
13
Eventually, repeating a common pattern, the legal writing field became
overwhelmingly female, and the salaries commanded by the new female faculty
were not even close to competitive, either with other faculty salaries or with the
law practice market.132
In addition to this telling (and gendered) evolution of the field, other
evidence demonstrates that the feminization of legal writing was not mere
happenstance, but that law schools purposefully sought out women lawyers who
were disillusioned or otherwise badly treated by the legal marketplace. One
dean of a prominent American law school was open about his desire to hire
women into low status positions when talking to a reporter about the newly
created legal writing program at his law school.'34 In an article titled, Tulane
Taps 'Mommy-Track' for Legal Writing and Research Instructors, a Dean is
quoted as saying that the lawyers sought for the legal writing jobs would
"typically be women who have taken leave of their employers in order to raise
families.' 35  The Dean explained that he had actively sought women for the
125 Id.
126 Levine & Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages, supra note 63, at 553 (citing Donald B. King, A
Survey Dealing with Legal Research and Writing Instructors, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406 (1959), which
noted that the men teaching legal writing were paid salaries commensurate with "the local or
regional salary paid by law firms for men of the same training and caliber.").
127 Id. at 566.
128 Id. at 566-67.
29 Id. at 567-68.
30 Id. at 568.
131 Levine & Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages, supra note 63, at 568-69.
132 Id. at 569; see also Strober, supra note 46, at 151-53 (describing a similar process by which
public school teaching became a low pay, female occupation); notes 47 to 57 and accompanying
text.
113 Larry Smith, Tulane Taps 'Mommy-Track' for Legal Writing and Research Instructors, 8
LAWYER HIRING AND TRAINING REPORT 13, 13 (Aug. 1991).
134 id.
135 Id.; see also ELUSIVE EQUALITY, supra note 108, at 33 (stating that when a Dean at one law
school "talked about hiring people to teach legal writing, he would say out loud, 'well we can get
education for cheap because we can hire people on the mommy-track.'").
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positions, by contacting "the major [city] firms, apprising them of the [new legal
writing] program and requesting the names of any lawyers who have recently
taken leaves of absence." '  Because Tulane did not want to pay for professional
legal writing training, women on the "mommy-track" offered "a viable
alternative" because the law school would only have to pay them "a few
thousand dollars per school year."'
' 37
The refreshingly open, if disturbing, statements by this dean echo the
anecdotal evidence that abounds in the legal academy that women are tracked
into legal writing positions because market discrimination will allow law schools
to pay women less and because of the perceived "feminine" nature of legal
writing, which of course is the primary reason it is devalued and
undercompensated1 38  This evidence explodes the common defense that
women's "choices" drive the high numbers of women in this low paying, low
prestige field.' 39 As one legal writing director noted,
Once you get on the tenure track, as I have, deans and other professors are
very likely to reveal to you their presumptions and biases about the gender
makeup of the best candidates for certain kinds of positions in a law school..
. I have lost count of the number of times I've heard people say things like
'[c]an't we just find and hire a few bright women in town who have left
practice to have babies?"' 4
Thus, the legal academic hierarchy is a form of illegitimate, non-
meritocratic and sexist stratification. When doctrinal professors and law school
deans benefit from this hierarchy, their benefits not only flow directly from sex
discrimination, but also perpetuate it. Feminist and egalitarian principles demand
that such a hierarchy be resisted.
136 Smith, supra note 133, at 13.
137 id.
138 Neumann, supra note 1, at 347.
139 WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 14-15, 37-39 (critiquing the choice rhetoric that dominates the
discussion of why women leave market work to stay home with children). In an argument highly
relevant to the legal writing field, Williams notes that the marginalization of women who do
"women's work" may reflect some choice, but it is choice made within the severe constraints of
discrimination. Id. at 37. As Williams notes, "choice and discrimination are not mutually
exclusive." Id. When women have to choose between trying to be an ideal worker in the market
without the family support that men enjoy or taking "mommy-track jobs or 'women's work,' that is
not equality," it is gender discrimination. Id. at 39.
140 Neumann, supra note 1, at 347.
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IV. LEGAL WRITING: A MODEL FOR A MORE
FEMINIST PEDAGOGY
In addition to the unjustifiable and sexist nature of the hierarchy, there is
another reason for feminists and other critical scholars to work to remedy the
subordination of legal writing professors. In its best forms, legal writing has
developed a pedagogical model that embraces cooperative and contextual
learning and has rejected the more rigid, combative forms of traditional law
teaching.
Feminist and other critical legal theorists have long criticized law school
pedagogy as hierarchical, inconsistent with educational goals, and alienating to
outsiders. The critiques focus on both the substance of law school courses and
methodology, as well as the alienatinA, often hostile, learning environment
experienced by outsiders in law school.' Some of the critiques are over twenty
years old, but the dominant paradigm of law school doctrinal pedagogy has not
changed substantially, and problems have persisted.142 Although many of the
feminist critiques were born out of the particular alienation felt by women in law
school, a feminist approach to pedagogy is one that seeks to enrich the law
school experience for all students. 43 Nevertheless, there is significant empirical
support for the premise that the law school experience has a negative "gendered
effect." 44
The methodological critiques of law school pedagogy urge a more
contextual, cooperative and empathetic learning environment that balances the
learning of legal doctrine with an emphasis on "the social context of legal
decision-making."' 45  Consistent with the general anti-hierarchical nature of
141 See generally Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988) (providing a feminist critique of tort doctrine); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias
in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988) (positing that the climate of the law school
classroom contributes to female silence and lack of participation); Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield
and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law School Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155
(1988) (critiquing male paradigms of law school teaching and offering a "female" model of law
school teacher); KENNEDY, supra note *, at 3, 27, 30, 61; Grant Gilmore, What is a Law School?,
15 CONN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982).
142 See Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, STAN. L.
REV. 1547, 154748 (1993) [hereinafter Missing Questions].
143 Id. at 1554 ("[Wle can affirm concerns that resonate with women's experiences, but on the basis
of feminist commitments, not biological categories."). This answers, to some extent, the concern
that a focus on feminist pedagogy ignores diversity in the views among women and feminist
theorists. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Perspectives on the Ideological Impact of Legal
Education Upon the Profession, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1259 (1994).
144 Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1994); Bartlett, supra note 143, at 1267.
14s Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1563-65; Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The
Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA
WOMEN's L.J. 81, 82-84, 108 (1996); Hantzis, supra note 141, at 162-63; Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
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feminism, feminist legal theorists are highly critical of the Socratic method,
which establishes the professor as all-knowing authoritarian who controls the
content and structure of the dialogue. 146 This methodology tends to isolate,
alienate and mystify students, particularly outsider students.' 47  In addition,
feminists and critical legal theorists also have criticized other aspects of
conventional law teaching-including the use of large classes, the lack of any
feedback until a final examination, and the emphasis on ranking students as
opposed to facilitating their educations.148  Not only does this foster a climate
unsuitable for learning law, but also may teach values at odds with the realities of
legal practice, which often requires teamwork and cooperation. 1
49
Feminists and critical scholars also have criticized the Langdellian case
method, a primary method of teaching legal doctrine, arguing that it
overemphasizes abstract and decontextualized rules of law, to the exclusion of
the more human aspects of legal practice.' 50 The case method encourages
students to divorce law from its human context and obscures the reality that law
is about people, with real problems, for whom legal decisions have very real
consequences.'5' Another by-product of the Langdellian approach is the absence
of "any sustained effort to address the emotional and interpersonal dimensions of
legal practice."'
5 2
Suggestions for reform of the educational environment include a re-
examination of the utility and effectiveness of the Socratic method, smaller
classes, more frequent assignments and more frequent feedback on a more
diverse range of skills, an emphasis on collaborative projects, simulations, role-
playing and interactive learning, and more attention to the human context of law
and legal problems.' 3 These feminist reforms describe the pedagogy of the more
thoughtful, advanced legal writing programs at American law schools. Legal
writing teachers have been at the forefront of pedagogical reform, and articles
Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law
School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 77-81 (1988); see Kennedy, supra note *, at 17, 30.
146 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1555; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 145,
at 77-81; Fischer, supra note 145, at 89; Guinier et al., supra note 144, at 45-46; KENNEDY, supra
note *, at 3, 61-62.
147 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1555; see also Fischer, supra note 145, at 86-87.
148 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1555-57; see also Fischer, supra note 145, at 89-
90; KENNEDY, supra note *, at 26-27.
149 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1556-57; see also Fischer, supra note 145, at 88-
90; KENNEDY, supra note *, at 65.
150 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1558-59; see also Bartlett, supra note 143, at
1265; KENNEDY, supra note *, at 6-13.
151 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1558-59; see also Margaret E. Montoya,
Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal
Discourse, 15 CMCANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1994).
152 Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1558-59.
13 Id. at 1563-64; see also Fischer, supra note 145, at 95-96; Guinier et al., supra note 144, at 93-
98; Hantzis, supra note 141, at 162-63.
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about more effective pedagogy, student learning styles, and other methods of
improving the teaching of law dominate legal writing scholarship.'
54
While it is by no means a perfect embodiment of feminist pedagogical
ideals, legal writing is, without question, one of the only required courses in law
school making consistent use of many techniques urged by feminist reformers.
55
Legal writing pedagogy rejects the traditional Socratic teaching style as well as
the Langdellian case method and instead employs a pedagogy focused on
experiential, cooperative learning.' 6 It is a course based on simulation and
problem solving and involves a high degree of interaction between professor and
student.157 That interaction includes frequent assignments, detailed, frequent and
constructive feedback, and individual meetings. 58 Legal writing professors have
documented their experimentation with cooperative pedagogical techniques such
as student collaboration, peer feedback, role playing, and various non-Socratic
154 See generally Clifford S. Zimmerman, "Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation ": Reflections
on Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 957 (1999)
(discussing collaborative learning); see also Anne Enquist, Critiquing and Evaluating Law
Students' Writing: Advice from Thirty-Five Experts, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1119 (1999)
(discussing how to critique papers); Durako et al., supra note 88; Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth
Beazley, Teaching Students How to "Think Like Lawyers": Integrating Socratic Method with the
Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 885 (1991); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the
Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993).
155 Of course, clinical courses also employ many of these techniques as well, but clinics,
unfortunately, rarely are required courses. I am not arguing here that legal writing pedagogy is
perfect, and I acknowledge that it struggles with many of the same problems that plague doctrinal
law teaching. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy
Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REv. 7 (1998) (like
doctrinal teaching, legal writing pedagogy can contribute to outsider alienation); see also Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Taking Legal Communications Seriously, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 137, 138 (2001) (like
doctrinal teaching, first year legal writing courses can be unduly focused on litigation).
156 See generally Durako et al., From Product to Process, supra note 88; Kathryn M. Stanchi,
Exploring the Law of Law Teaching: A Feminist Process, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 194 (2000);
Jan M. Levine, Leveling the Hill of Sisyphus: Becoming a Professor of Legal Writing, 26 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1067, 1072 (1999); see, e.g., Robin S. Wellford-Slocum, The Law School Student-
Faculty Conference: Towards a Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. TEx. L. REV. 225
(2004) (explaining how to conduct student conferences); Mary Dunnewold, "Feed-Forward"
Tutorials, Not "Feedback" Reviews," 6 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEG. RESEARCH AND WRITING
105 (1998) (explaining how to conduct student conferences); Linda L. Berger, A Reflective
Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEG. WRITING 57 (2000)
(discussing how to effectively critique students' writing). Although legal writing pedagogy does
make use of Socratic dialogue, particularly in critiquing student papers, it eschews the version of
the Socratic method used in large doctrinal classrooms, which is the version at the center of
feminist critique. See Kearney & Beazley, supra note 154, at 886, 889; David S. Romantz, The
Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L.
REV. 105, 140 (2003).
157 Durako et al., From Product to Process, supra note 88, at 727; see Farley, supra note 73, at 356.
158 Durako et al., From Product to Process, supra note 88, at 726, 732-33; Levine, supra note 156,
at 1072.
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in-class exercises.1 59 Legal writing professors care about teaching and learning
and spend a great deal of time mentoring and advising their students-so much
so that the profession has, more than once, been compared to parenting.' 60
These reforms have the potential to change not only the reigning pedagogy
of law school, but also the male face of the tenured law professorate. Feminists
have long been at the forefront of the movement to change the value system of
the legal academy-in part because even the ostensibly "neutral" value system of
the legal academy seemed to devalue anything feminine or feminist. This
movement has most notably focused on how law school pedagogy devalues
relational reasoning and how the legal academy values different kinds of
scholarship.16' Broadening the concept "law professor" to include a wider
pedagogy and a wider variety of human characteristics and strengths is a natural
part of this movement, and in that sense, is feminist.
Part of the work of feminist law reformers and legal writing professors must
include asking questions like: Why are teaching excellence and student relations
activities devalued? Why is a stellar scholar who cannot, or will not, teach
effectively more valuable than a stellar teacher who is not a scholar? Why
should the law school teaching model be so skewed in favor of approaches that
are evaluative as opposed to pedagogical? In sum, why must there be only one
model of tenured law professor-scholar first, teacher second--one, not
coincidentally, in which men seem far more comfortable than women? These are
an especially important set of questions for feminist deans.
The bottom line is that legal writing is a well-spring of significant
pedagogical advances in the legal academy--despite the low reward for this kind
of work and the poor treatment of legal writing professors. These pedagogical
advances mirror in important ways the reforms of law school teaching urged by
feminists and critical scholars and represent a rich, untapped resource within the
academy. 62 Feminist and critical legal scholars and legal writing professors have
159 See, e.g., Durako et al., From Product to Process, supra note 88, at 726; see also Zimmerman,
supra note 154; Kirsten K. Davis, Designing and Using Peer Review in a First-Year Legal
Research and Writing Course, 9 LEG. WRITING 1 (2003); Jo Anne Durako, Peer Editing: It's Worth
It, 7 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEG. RESEARCH & WRITING 73 (1999); Elizabeth L. Inglehart et al.,
From Cooperative Learning to Collaborative Writing in the Legal Writing Classroom, 9 LEG.
WRITING 185 (2003); Barbara Tyler, Active Learning Benefits for All Learning Styles: 10 Easy
Ways to Improve Your Teaching Today, 11 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEG. RESEARCH AND WRITING
106 (2003).6 0 Farley, supra note 73, at 356; Stanchi & Levine, Gender and Legal Writing, supra note 1, at 23.
161 For discussion of legal education's valuation of the rational over the relational, see, e.g., Susan
H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1571, 1574 (1993); Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 142, at 1555-56, 1558-59; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 145, at 77-81. For discussion of the legal academy's devaluation of feminist
scholarship, see, e.g., Cain, supra note 108, at 29-32; Levit, supra note 77, at 793, 795-800;
Delgado, supra note 108, at 1363, 1372.
162 Arrigo, supra note 81, at 168-70 (discussing the often radical pedagogical ideas of legal writing,
many of which conflict with the legal academic tradition).
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substantial overlapping interests that could be a source of power and positive
change within the legal academy, if we work together.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the treatment of legal writing professors by
American law schools creates a contrived, illegitimate and gendered status
hierarchy that exploits women's labor, perpetuates male dominance and takes
advantage of gender discrimination in the market. The essay also has argued that
feminists, critical legal scholars and legal writing professors have much in
common, and, if our efforts were combined, could be a real source of change
within the academy. Too often, however, the hierarchy is accepted as a given,
even by those who have resisted it in other contexts, and those at the bottom are
rendered invisible, even to those who have fought against their own invisibility.
This paper is critical, but its message is ultimately positive. A
quintessential part of the feminist journey is to listen and hear the stories of the
marginalized, even if it makes us uncomfortable, and even if we must confront
our own complicity in the marginalization of others. One step in that journey for
feminist and egalitarian professors and deans is to listen to and learn the stories
of legal writing professors. Walk down the hall, or across the building, at your
law school and find us. Talk to us about our status, our pedagogy, and our
teaching philosophy. Ask us to lunch. We are interesting, vibrant people with
many of the same goals as you! Read our work. Listen with an open mind-
acknowledge difference without being defensive. Look for similarities--there
are many. And, last but not least, speak out! Question, criticize and resist the
baseless hierarchy that keeps this mostly female profession at the bottom.
2004]

